Research within the history of economic thought has focused only little on the development of economics under dictatorship. This paper attempts to show how a country with a relatively large and internationally established community of social scientists in the 1920s, the Soviet Union, was subjected to repression. We tell this story through the case of Isaak Il'ich Rubin, a prominent Russian economist and historian of economic thought, who in the late 1920s was denounced by rival scholars and repressed by the political system. By focusing not only on his life and work, but also that of his opponents and institutional clashes, we show how the decline of a social science tradition in Russia and the USSR emerged as a process over time. We analyze the complex interplay of ideas, scholars and their institutional context, and conclude that subsequent repression was arbitrary, suggesting that no clear survival or career strategy existed in the Stalinist system due to a situation of fundamental uncertainty. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how the Stalinization of Soviet social sciences occurred as a process over time.
INTRODUCTION
Research within the history of economic thought has focused only little on the development of economics under dictatorship. This paper attempts to show how a country with a relatively large and internationally established community of social scientists in the 1920s, the Soviet Union, was subjected to repression. The Stalinization of academia was a major cause of adverse selection, when old specialists were replaced by younger and risk-avoiding scholars with little education and independence of mind (Sutela 2008, p. 177) . We tell this story through the case of Isaak Il'ich Rubin, a prominent Russian economist and historian of economic thought, who in the late 1920s was denounced by rival scholars and repressed by the political system. By focusing not only on his life and work, but also that of his opponents and institutional clashes, we show how the decline of a social science tradition in Russia and the USSR emerged as a process over time. We analyze the complex interplay of ideas, scholars and their institutional context, and conclude that subsequent repression was arbitrary, suggesting that no clear survival or career strategy existed in the Stalinist system due to a situation of fundamental uncertainty.
William Coleman (2002, p. 90) has noted how totalitarian regimes in the twentieth century embraced economics to the extent it furthered the realization the leaders' preferences, or 'vision'. Economics, he argues, was always contested, with pockets of 'anti-economics' existing in disharmonious coexistence since at least the 1700s. The meaning of 'anti-economics' is historically elusive, but may include for instance the rejection of ideas such as consumer sovereignty, restraints and alternative costs, and economic liberalism (i.e., no regard for individual economic prerogative).
From this perspective, arguably, anti-economics reached its logical limit in the twentieth century under the dictatorships of Stalin and Hitler. 4 But whereas economists were repressed in Germany primarily on racial and/or political grounds, thus leaving certain -primarily the more conservative -institutions almost intact, no such traditions had any chance of survival under the Soviet regime. Stalinist repression was more far-reaching, touching whole institutions and groups of scholars. Knowledge under Stalin's dictatorship, in other words, was cultivated only by the grace of political authority, and economics as a science was antithetical to the dictator's vision.
5
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how the Stalinization of Soviet social sciences occurred as a process over time. We take as our point of departure the case of Isaak Il'ich Rubin, a 4 For a verification that Coleman's notion of an 'anti-economics' did exist in the Soviet Union, at least in the later Stalin period, see Wiles (1952) . See also an official exposition of Soviet economics, published in translation by the American Economic Review (Leont'ev et al. 1944) , and the commentaries this article stimulated in the same journal (Baran 1944; Lange 1945) . 5 Mathematical economics, more specifically linear programming, did flourish at a later point in time in the Soviet Union. This branch of economics, however, was taught separately from other fields in the social sciences.
Russian economist and historian of economic thought, whose life and subsequent fate became immediately and dramatically intertwined with the violent events of Stalin's 'Cultural Revolution'.
Besides being an outstanding scholar in his own right, the choice of Rubin can be explained for primarily two reasons. Firstly, he inadvertently became a key victim in one of the first political 'show trials' against former social democrats (Mensheviks) in 1931, a trial involving "some of the country's best economists in key positions" (Liebich 1997, p. 202) . Secondly, Rubin was a prominent and independent-minded authority on the interpretation of Marx, a feature which made him a key opponent for the actors who in the late 1920s forced their ideology of Marxism-Leninism upon not only the social sciences, but virtually all fields of science, and the future development path of society (Byrnes 1991; Graham 1993; Gerovitch 1996; Pollock 2006) . The Rubin case provides us with a prism through which to gauge the decline of a social science tradition in Russia and other former Soviet republics.
6
This paper connects to previous research placing the Soviet economic debates of the 1920s and 1930s in their historical and institutional context (Barnett 1998; Barnett 2006; Owen 2009; Shirokorad & Zweynert 2011) . The gist of our analysis, in other words, focuses not so much on the analytic content of the economic ideas as such, as on the political and institutional clashes emerging around them (although the two are not readily distinguishable). Following Coleman's thesis, it is an interesting task to investigate what different strategies were adopted by economists in these clashes, and whether certain strategies were also more successful. The formation of a 'Stalin group' of academics and intellectuals in the late 1920s within the social sciences has long been a well-known fact (Fitzpatrick 1999, p. 204) . We know, however, only little about these groups, or how their emergence became linked to the general decline of a social science tradition in Russia and the USSR.
We contribute to this discussion as regards the case of Rubin and Soviet economics and pose some The structure of the paper is as follows. The first part provides an introduction to the general political context and the conditions for economics research in the 1920s, with special emphasis on key institutions. The penultimate part provides evidence on Rubin's life and work, and situates the 6 Two countries with large economies -China (where Marxism-Leninism is still a mandatory framework in institutes of higher learning)
and Russia (with a history of Marxism-Leninism) -rank relatively low in academic rankings. In the September 2012 RePEc ranking of countries by number of citations, Russia ranked place 65, immediately above Taiwan, but below Poland, Colombia and Hungary. We believe this relatively low ranking, in relation for example to the size of the Russian economy, can be traced (at least in part) to the destruction of tradition and human capital within the social sciences during the 1920s and 1930s. For a review of the state of Russian economics in the early 1990s, assessing the Soviet legacy, see Alexeev, Gaddy and Leitzel (1992) . An overall view is given by Poletayev (2010) .
clashes which eventually arose around him in their institutional setting. The last part describes the Menshevik trial and the repression of Rubin in 1931, and situates this case in the larger context of the decline of a social science tradition in the Soviet Union.
SOVIET ECONOMICS IN THE 1920s.
For many years, little was known of the fates of the economists who had fallen at the hands of the Stalinist regime. Occasional references to the purges surfaced in the West, such as when Wassily
Leontief -the Russian born economist who had been forced to leave his homeland in 1925 -wrote on the "decline and rise of Soviet economic science" in 1960 (Leontief 1960) . Arguably, only scattered information was available until the publication by another exile, Naum Jasny, whose Soviet
Economists of the Twenties. Names to be Remembered (1972) was for long the only source on prominent Soviet economists who had fallen victim to the repression. Whatever else we knew about the period relied on information which had transpired through biographies, dissident literature, and in official publications through the 1920s and 1930s (Medvedev 1971; Davies 1989) . With the opening of the former Soviet archives, historians now have access to a significantly wider source base.
Beginning in 1921, the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP) was proclaimed, which until the late 1920s combined government control with a modicum of private enterprise. According to Vincent Barnett (2006, p. 113) , the period was also "the heterodox decade par excellence in the USSR with respect to the range of different currents that were represented, with only the Gorbachev disintegration period coming close." Within Soviet academia and administration there was a panoply of economists ranging from the neoclassical tradition, such as the liberal Leonid Yurovsky and the business cycle analyst Sergei Pervushin, to agrarian approaches, such as the neo-Narodnik Alexander Chayanov, and various Marxist currents (Jasny 1972, p. 209) . The State Planning Commission, Gosplan, was at the time a "great stronghold of Menshevik forces" (Jasny 1954, 53) . Simultaneously, however, sweeping purges by the Soviet security organs (the Cheka) led to the closure of several established economic journals -and the involuntary emigration of several talented economists. Old institutions, such as the Academy of Sciences, lost more than half of its prerevolutionary membership to death and migration between 1917 and 1923 (Levin 1988: 262) .
The first losses of human capital within economics were associated with the (forced)
emigration of scholars such as Simon Kuznets (in 1922 ), Jakob Marschak (in 1919 ), Peter Struve (in 1920 ), Paul Baran (in 1928 and Wassily Leontief (in 1925 (Barnett 2004) . Later contributors to economics found an ability to work on theoretical problems within other disciplines, for example Leonid Kantorovich, who was trained as a mathematician. 9 The measures had in fact been ordered on behest of Lenin, who in May the same year had instructed Stalin: "the entire staff of Ekonomist, are the most ruthless enemies. The lot -out of Russia. This must be done at once" (Lenin 1996: 169, bold in original) . The original reports by the Soviet secret police, listing all the names of scholars to be arrested, have been published in Khaustov et al. (2003, pp. 42-57 The history of the MEI is relevant to our story as it was not only an important academic milieu and the institutional base for Rubin, but also because the fates of Rubin and Riazanov would eventually be dramatically intertwined. Riazanov was a strong and well-known intellectual, who on the basis of his good relations with party leaders was able to secure an independent position for his institute. He also seems to have harbored a strong dislike for Stalin, whom he considered to be brute and intellectually inferior -opinions he did not hide (see Beecher & Fomichev 2006) . In other words, the Conjuncture Institute as well as the MEI had two distinctive and perhaps paradoxical characteristics which made them fairly unique among Soviet research institutes: they remained relatively autonomous from political interference and pursued original research, and they were able to develop independent networks with foreign scholars and academic institutes (including academic exchanges, joint publications, translations, and citations).
It is therefore no coincidence that both institutes were early victims of Stalin's ascendancy to power in the late 1920s. Kondrat'ev was dismissed already in 1928, seeing his
Conjuncture Institute disappearing in a merger with the State Planning Commission. In early 1931 the dictator drew on fabricated documents in order to implicate Rubin and Riazanov in a great conspiracy to overthrow the Soviet government, and 127 of the institute's 244 members of staff were purgedamong them many skilled translators, archivists, economists, philosophers and historians (Rokityansky & Müller 1996, pp. 116-117) . The Marx-Engels Institute was soon merged with the Lenin Institute, becoming a simple tool of propaganda under its new director Vladimir Adoratsky (by whom Riazanov had been openly denounced). Independent scholarship within the social sciences was no longer permissible, as academic institutions were put under party control and sequestered their international networks (Graham 1993, 93; Treml 2003) .
ISAAK RUBIN AND SOVIET ECONOMICS
Soviet leaders were convinced that Marxism had a fundamental role to play for the understanding and development of all fields of science, including the 'exact sciences' (Joravsky 1961) . Current books and debates in Marxist political philosophy enjoyed large audiences and were frequently provided space in official party organs such as Pravda and Izvestia. Economics, it was argued, had to be placed on a scientific Marxist footing. This issue of scientific priority, needless to say, was never seriously questioned. At stake, however, was the issue of interpretation and authority. Over the course of the 1920s, there was a growing intellectual and institutional rivalry, and there were different groups adhering to different interpretations of key issues in Marxism, such as the subject matter of political economy, value theory, state planning and the meaning of socialism. Marxism was at the heart of Soviet political discourse, and the demand for comprehensive books giving a coherent and teachable interpretation of Marxist thought was large among scholars, functionaries and teachers in the postrevolutionary years. 10 Further, seemingly abstract theoretical discussions often reflected current economic and political agendas, giving academic discussions ideological significance. It was therefore a non-trivial question who should provide the analytical supply. (1923) , and the extremely readable and original A History of Economic Ideas (1926), Rubin initially provided much of the supply in the 1920s. The books underwent several editions, and circulated widely -regarded by many contemporaries from various fields of social sciences at the time as the most authoritative. So how does it come that Rubin, within a few years time, was subjected to denunciation, persecution and repression? Several factors came to conspire against him, most importantly the fact that Rubin had been a well-known social democrat (Menshevik). This did not distinguish him among fellow economists (most of whom were social democrats, liberals or non-Bolshevik socialists), but his political outlook within short became the loci of his opponents' attacks. There were also other reasons, 10 See, for example, the diary of a well-known Soviet historian Militsa V. Nechkina (2004) that reflects the interest in the collection of the articles on political economy co-edited by Rubin. intellectual, institutional and personal. In order to see how, some basic contours of Rubin's life and work could be beneficially sketched. police (only to be amnestied on 17 October the same year). Now he found himself in a peculiarly reversed position, being not too far to the left, but to the right, vis-à-vis the regime in power. Even though he was released shortly afterwards, he was arrested also on 5 November, again for only a short while (about three weeks).
With his influential Essays on Marx' Theory of Value
These arrests, which were only the first of what was to come, were in line with Bolshevik jurisprudence since the beginning. A unique feature of Soviet law was that it punished not only real enemies of the state, but also potential enemies of the state (including people who themselves were not yet aware they were enemies, and therefore had to be unmasked by the security organs). The policy was to keep the Soviet state safe from any individual or group of individuals who could pose a social danger without the actual commission of an illegal act. The policy gave the security organs significant discretion in meeting out repressive measures. People were arrested, imprisoned or executed for who they were, rather than for what they did. The 1918 Red Terror decree, for example, targeted explicitly prominent Mensheviks and members of other parties in order to confine them to prison (Gregory 2009, pp. 109-10 ).
Rubin, already one of the top authorities in political economy at the time, never ceased his scientific endeavors when in jail or afterwards. After his release, he began preparations for the first edition of his Essays (1923) , and completed a number of reviews and articles. The same year his book was published, he was again arrested on 14 March and sentenced to a concentration camp for three years (of which 22 months were spent in jail, the remainder in Crimea). This was a punishment for his continued interaction with Russian social democrats, and the help he as a lawyer had extended to members of another oppositionist party, the Socialist Revolutionaries, who had been subjected to the (1925) and Contemporary Economists in the West (1927) . It is telling of this dedicated scholar, that he upon his transfer from a stronger prison regime to exile by the Black Sea in 1924, asked for the release to be delayed. "In case of an early release", he argued, "I will not be able to finish a complete draft… and in the best circumstances my work will be put on hold for 2-3 months" (quote in Vasina & Rokityanskii 1992, p. 138) . Such conditions for a continuation of a massive research effort had obviously not been possible without the dedicated help from his family and colleagues, who struggled for his transfer to a more hospitable climate and to make sure he had access to important literature. After his release, these efforts also made it possible for him to settle freely within the country. 12 Rubin's participation in the Menshevik party and his work as a lawyer for the socialist revolutionaries is confirmed by archival documents, see Galili and Nenarokov (2004, p. 63 'wrecking activity' -marks perhaps the beginning of this process. The IRP, situated in a building of an old Moscow monastery, is usually considered one of the most important Party schools of the early Stalin era where future experts in the teaching of Marxism and communist ideology were trained (Behrendt 1997; Kozlova 1994 There is some merit to this argument with one important caveat. As the political landscape changed from 1926 until 1931 the debates were more complicated, and to some extent we are observing an object evolving over time. Rubin's critics were also not uniform, and there were important philosophical traditions which seemingly cut through different political backgrounds.
Before proceeding to the actual institutional and ideological clashes it is necessary to briefly elucidate two main specificities of Rubin's interpretation of Marx. The first and most important feature of Rubin's work was his attempt to emphasize social and qualitative aspects of value, rather than the pure physical or technical aspects. The essence of Marx' theory of value, as Rubin argued, was the specific social form it assumed under capitalism and not the simpler causal relationship between embodied labor time and prices of production. Hence the significance of the concept of 'value form' as the social form of the product of labor, which reflects the particular social character of labor in commodity production (Rubin 1978) . Value, for Rubin, was inextricably linked to the particular social relations and their forms of appearance in a capitalist market economy, and not just the technological process of transforming labor time into products (see Saad-Filho 2002, p. 27 ).
14 The second feature of Rubin's contribution follows the first one. For Rubin, the social form of value involved exchange and money as its essential elements. He took pains to explain how this argument did not boil down to the identification of production and exchange, and proposed specific terminological distinctions. Nevertheless, the general (in fact, Hegelian) idea was fairly straight-forward: essence (value of labor) cannot be separated from its appearance (forms of exchange and money as social phenomena). Therefore, the value of a commodity could not be separated from the exchange process, i.e. from the sale of commodities for money (Likitkijsomboon 1995, p. 90) . For a Marxist believing in the virtues of a planned economy, Rubin's interpretation of Marx could be seen as tantamount to a defense of the market (a theoretical 'mistake' which could then be explained by the fact that Rubin was a social democrat). These are the political connotations of the Rubin case.
The first public polemics against Rubin began in 1927. The third edition of his Essays contained a new chapter, 'Replies to My Critics', including a lengthy reply to Isaak Dashkovskii, a
Ukrainian economist and supporter of the Trotsky opposition, on the issue of abstract labor.
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Dashkovskii was the first to attack Rubin. Rubin also retorted to criticism from S. Shabs, whose book
Problems of Social Labor in Marx's Economic System (1928), carried the subtitle 'A Critique of I.
Rubin's Essays on Marx' Theory of Value'. 16 Rubin's rather lengthy chapter also contained a large discussion on abstract labor, framed as a response to criticism from Alexander Kon. Summarizing the argument's put forward in these debates one may identify some various types of criticism. Rubin was accused of deviating from historical materialism, neglecting the role of technique and material productive forces in political economy and instead emphasizing the role of social form that for him should be the primary object of study. This allowed his critics to stigmatize him as an idealist and antiMarxist who praised the market and not planning, ideal abstract forms and not concrete problems of the Soviet economy, Marxist exegesis and not the "true" Leninist materialism.
The centerpiece of the anti-Rubin group was the publication of an edited volume, However, the political situation before the publication the Rubinshchina volume -which coincided with Rubin's arrest the same year -had in fact been more complex and did not look completely hopeless for Rubin. One year earlier, a group of young scholars had published a defense of (Borilin, Leont'ev, 1929 eventually be denounced as a 'menshevizing idealist' and removed from his high-rank position in Soviet philosophy, but at the time the two camps carried equal sway.
Rubin -Against Mechanist Tendencies in Political Economy
The two editors of the pro-Rubin volume, Boris Borilin and Lev Leont'ev (penname A.
Leont'ev), would also come to play crucial roles in subsequent events. In their volume, the editors made two major points. Firstly, Rubin's position was contextualized and reinterpreted by Leont'ev in relation to the anti-mechanist movement. The mechanists, it was argued, neglected the subtleties of dialectical methodology and were ignorant of the dialectical nature of society, with its conflicting forces at work. They were also criticized for their neglect of what the editors regarded as the inherently and irreducibly social character of economic activity. The ideological component of this theoretical argument was provided by Borilin, who in his article connected the debate to the ongoing industrialization process of the Soviet economy. Social relations of production, he argued, were crucial to recognize at this point in time. And to "confuse" technical and economic categories, like Bessonov and the mechanists allegedly did, seemed to him particularly "dangerous" and "harmful". In fact, to disregard the social structures at work, was equivalent to equating socialism with electrification (p.
96). 21
Secondly, Leont'ev contended that Rubin's approach might be incorrect in its details and specific formulations, but that in general (especially after the third edition of his Essays, in which Rubin corrected some definitions to avoid misunderstanding and provided a detailed answer to his critics with a devastating anti-critique) his approach was the more fruitful, especially in comparison to the "awkward" and "self-contradictory" theses provided by his opponents. Further essays in the volume attempted to substantiate this claim by illustrating various inconsistencies in the work of Bessonov and Kon, and its alleged incompatibility with Marxist theory.
Leont'ev and Borilin are interesting to our story, in consideration of how both of them in 1930 -only one year after their edited volume -would publicly denounce Rubin and renounce their own previously held ideas. Both of them had been students at IRP, and would later teach in a number of higher institutes. Leont'ev moved to MEI in 1931 -after Riazanov's arrest -and published a new political economy textbook for party schools and study groups. In 1939 he became a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, and was conferred the title of professor at the Higher Party School. From 1946 he became a full member of the Academy of Sciences and a member of the Pravda editorial board, remaining highly active for the rest of his life. Borilin had been engaged in party work 21 Put into more contemporary language, Borilin emphasized the role of institutions for the transition to a 'planned economy', warning against putting too much weight on purely technological development.
since the early 1920s, studying at IRP between 1923 and 1927. Upon graduation he taught political economy, later 'overcoming' his own (presumably 'idealistic') background with a book in 1930, denouncing the 'right deviator' Bukharin. In 1931 Borilin entered a position at Gosplan -which had also been previously purged.
The shift which apparently occurred in 1929-1930 can be explained by the personal intervention by Stalin, who in this period consolidated his personal dictatorship. On 10 February, 1930, he called for a "struggle on two fronts" -a clear reference to Civil War rhetoric -meaning more precisely the struggle "both against 'Rubinism' and against 'mechanism'." The dilemma, Stalin (1930) argued, was that these debates had "been diverted from the basic questions of Soviet economy" into "the realm of Talmudic abstractions, thus wasting two years of effort on abstract themes-to the satisfaction and advantage, of course, of our enemies." The above mentioned Borilin, and another young IRP economist, Vladimir Miliutin (who in 1930 also denounced Kondrat'ev), simultaneously published their article "On the Controversies in Political Economy" in the two widely circulated journals "Bolshevik" and "Economic Issues", denouncing not only Riazanov, Rubin and Deborin, but also mechanists such as Bessonov and Shabs. 22 This was again a somewhat unexpected occurrence,
Miliutin being a former Menshevik and Borilin, as we saw, a former student of Rubin. Both of them loyal Stalinists, they were nevertheless swept up in the Great Terror, murdered in 1938 (Manevich 1991) .
It is remarkable how quickly a previously independent social science tradition was repressed in the late 1920s. Notably, no clear 'win-win' strategy for academic or physical survival during the Stalinization of the social sciences seems to have existed. A study of the individuals involved suggests that both independent economists and perfectly loyal Stalinists could be subjected to repression, and any eventual outcome did not depend on whether a person would for example denounce other scholars or publicly renounce a politically implicated past -two of the most typical strategies adopted in this time period -a result which suggests that repression was also arbitrary. In other words, a story of the debates and confrontations in the Soviet 1920s needs to be sufficiently thick, so that the account of the shifting intellectual, individual and political disputes are not over- [Lev] Leont'ev, Abram Mendel'son). In 1932, 9 of the 11 new members were purged again, among them the editor Miliutin and his compatriot Borilin -two steadfastly loyal Stalinists. Lastly, in 1935, new waves of purges hit the journal (Shirokorad, 2010) .
THE MENSHEVIK PROCESS
The last phase in the destruction of a social science tradition in the Soviet Union followed the period of mounting clashes in the late 1920s. It is notable that economists were among the first academic groups to suffer at the hands of Stalinist repression. This process had a clear political rationale, as Stalin established his role as the country's undisputed leader, relying among other groups on loyal followers at institutes such as the IRP. We now know how the dictator drew on these forces to purge more independent institutions such as the Academy of Sciences, Gosplan and the MEI. In 1929 in the Academy of Sciences over 100 old members were purged (the second purge in a decade), many of them historians and archivists. These arrests were later connected to new conspiracies, such as the "discovery" of a new counterrevolutionary organization in 1930 -the so called Toiling Peasant Party (TKP) -which in fact had been orchestrated by Stalin personally. On 5 September a Politburo resolution made official the arrests of Kondrat'ev and Chayanov among others, implicated in this affair (Khaustov 2003, p. 252 ). On 9 December Stalin instructed a party cell at IRP to "launch a critique with vengeance" and "to prepare for a fight". "Do not forget about Riazanov", he added. "In general, the Marx-Engels Institute needs to be removed" (Smirnova 1989, p. 83) .
Archival documents reveal how Stalin personally plotted and closely followed the and thus suspicious by default, were such a possible scapegoat. However, as pointed out by Kendall Bailes (1974, p. 448) and Barnett (2005, p. 127) , the repression and show trials served also other interests. Most prominently, these fabricated allegations constituted an effective way of silencing and isolating independent-minded expertise in Soviet academia and institutions. Openly discussing the purges of engineers in June 1931 , Stalin (1931 conceded how "naturally… the Soviet Government could pursue only one policy towards the old technical intelligentsia-the policy of smashing the active wreckers, differentiating the neutrals and enlisting those who were loyal [italics in original]."
THE DEMISE OF RUBIN
On 31 December 1930 Rubin was formally accused of participation in the 'counter-revolutionary Menshevik Party' in cooperation with other counter-revolutionary organizations, in order "to overthrow Soviet power through the organization of wrecking activity, and to prepare for intervention." These accusations were so strong, the interrogator argued, that "citizen Rubin has been sufficiently revealed for [his participation] in these committed crimes" [sic] and could therefore be arrested on charges of "counter-revolutionary" activities. Rubin's careful and judicially delicate reply, issued on the same document, simply states that he had not upheld "any relations whatsoever to the Menshevik Party since 1923", and that he did not know of anyone who could be said to belong this group. 24 Due to his refusal to confess fabricated charges, Rubin was subjected to further pressure.
Thanks to the recollections of Rubin's sister, Bliuma Il'inichna Rubina, made available in Medvedev (1971, p. 132) , we have also an alternative source to complement the official interrogation protocols. According to Rubina, her brother had found the first accusations ridiculous, 23 Some Western observers, primarily of the communist bent, were convinced the allegations were true. See Holmes (1931) It would soon transpire that the confession the security organs tried to coerce related specifically to Riazanov; whom Stalin wanted to implicate in the Menshevik trial. On 29 January, Riazanov's name begins to occur in the existing protocols. The exact content of the different protocols is fairly irrelevant (and factually incorrect), and as the 'confessions' were also re-written ("corrected")
by the investigator, there is no way of reconstructing exactly how Rubin attempted to resist the charges. But it seems clear that he, as far as possible, tried to insulate Riazanov from the accusations.
"My brother", Rubina noted, had told her that "speaking against Riazanov was just like speaking against his own father." In his cell, Rubina recounted, he 'began to beat his head against the wall.
Anyone who knew how calm and self-controlled Rubin was can understand what a state he had been brought to' (Medvedev 1971, pp. 134-6) . On 2 February, Rubin "confessed" to having provided
Riazanov with three documents "of great interest to the history of [Russian social democracy]", documents which Riazanov then agreed to keep safe in case Rubin was arrested (Litvin 1999, p. 588 demanded to see this alleged evidence. "You won't find them anywhere", replied Riazanov, "unless you've put them there yourself!" (Serge 1963, p. 251) . Riazanov was arrested the same night, and on 20 February the interrogators arranged a 'confrontation' (ochnaya stavka) between the two victims.
The absurd exchange, where Rubin simply replied verbatim to the statements by the interrogator, revealed to Riazanov a man "whose nervous system has been completely broken." The official
Menshevik trial, held on 1-8 March the same year, officially indicted 14 individuals, the majority of whom were economists -but we now know from the archives that the actual number of repressed was in fact 122 (Litvin 1999) . On 25 November, a troika of the local security police office convicted Rubin in his absence for participation in counter-revolutionary activity. At the bottom of the short ruling the following words were entered: "Decision. Rubin, Isaak Il'ich DEATH BY SHOOTING, personal 26 For an authoritative summary of the official court transcripts, see Jasny (1972). property to be confiscated" (bold in original). Two days later, on 27 November, the ruling was enforced, and Rubin's life was ended. Rubin was unconditionally rehabilitated in March 1991.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Russia is the largest country in modern history to have lost what was a significant social science tradition for close to six decades. Important work was done throughout the Soviet period in different fields, but scholars suffered from censorship, and they were deprived of correspondence with foreign colleagues or institutes. As the history of economics during the Cold War is now being written, the implications of this fact for social scientists on both sides of the iron curtain needs to be more fully understood. We have attempted to explain the demise of an existing social science tradition in Soviet Russia, drawing primarily on a case study of Isaak Rubin and the institutional and political clashes around him. This process, as we have shown, was a process which occurred over time and which to some extent was also open-ended. No clear win-win strategy seems to have existed under these conditions of fundamental uncertainty, and in the end former opponents of the regime as well as perfectly loyal Stalinists could be subjected to repression (or escape it, depending on the circumstances). Many different factors, intellectual, political and institutional, were important but not determinate.
Tentatively, we find that at least three dominant strategies emerged in the clashes of the late 1920s. Firstly, there were individuals -such as Rubin -who actively defended themselves against their critics. Secondly, there were individuals who opportunistically denounced other scholars, in order to further their careers, and gain intellectual, institutional or political clout. Here we find most of Rubin's critics. Thirdly, there were individuals, who faced with a barrage of criticism renounced their own past, and publicly converted to the official orthodoxy. The tragic case of Blyumin, whose own work was so strongly influenced by Rubin, is a case in point (Shirokorad and Zweynert 2011) . One should also note how some prominent economists of the 1920s escaped persecution completely, perhaps by chance. Scholars such as Slutsky and Pervushin survived the purges and could continue to work within Soviet academia or administration. Their pioneering works on business cycles and statistical methods were finished however, and could not be resumed (Owen 2009 ).
Our case study fits well into the science politics of the time. The Stalinists downplayed the importance of original research and theoretical studies, emphasizing the importance of techniques and knowledge with more immediate practical applications for planning and industrialization (Bailes, 1974, p. 463; Graham 1973, p. 62) . Scientific institutions of all brands were coerced and involuntarily infiltrated by cadres whose primary qualification was their adherence to dialectical materialism. It is therefore not surprising that whereas a survey of 25,286 scientific workers in 1930 found that only 8 % of the researchers in the 'exact sciences' were members of the communist party, the membership rate within the social sciences had already reached a full 68.7 % (Josephson 1988, p. 255) . It is an irony of history, that the research programs expounded by these allegedly more practical economists were found useless during the years of perestoika and the transition in the early 1990s, when the new leaders received little of value from Marxism-Leninism to guide them through the deepest changes experienced since precisely the 1920s (Åslund 1987 ).
